




We show a clear sense in which general relativity allows for a type of
“machine” which can bring about a spacetime structure suitable for the
implementation of “supertasks.”
1 Introduction
In what follows, the intersection of two concepts in the foundations of general
relativity are investigated: (1) Malament-Hogarth spacetimes which allow for
a type of “supertask” in which a future infinite timelike curve is contained in
the past of a spacetime event and (2) “machine” spacetimes which bring about
various properties from initial conditions (e.g. “time machines” are spacetimes
which bring about a particular type of unusual causal structure). After in-
troducing a quite general characterization of machine spacetimes, we consider
various definitions of “Malament-Hogarth machines” and show their existence.
The upshot of our work is this: there a clear sense in which general relativity
allows for a type of machine which can bring about a spacetime structure suit-
able for the implementation of supertasks. We close by outlining a program for
future work on the subject.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with a few preliminaries concerning the relevant background formalism
of general relativity.1 An n-dimensional, relativistic spacetime (for n ≥ 2) is a
pair of mathematical objects (M, gab): M is a smooth (connected) n-dimensional
manifold and gab is a smooth metric on M of Lorentz signature (+,−, ...,−).
Note that M is assumed to be Hausdorff; for any distinct p, q ∈M , one can find
disjoint open sets Op and Oq containing p and q respectively.
For each point p ∈ M , the metric assigns a cone structure to the tangent
space Mp. Any tangent vector ξ
a in Mp will be timelike if gabξ
aξb > 0, null if
gabξ
aξb = 0, or spacelike if gabξ
aξb < 0. Null vectors create the cone structure;
1The reader is encouraged to consult Hawking and Ellis (1973), Wald (1984), and Malament
(2012) for details. An outstanding (and less technical) survey of the global structure of
spacetime is given by Geroch and Horowitz (1979).
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timelike vectors are inside the cone while spacelike vectors are outside. A time
orientable spacetime is one that has a continuous timelike vector field on M . A
time orientable spacetime allows one to distinguish between the future and past
lobes of the light cone. In what follows, it is assumed that spacetimes are time
orientable and that an orientation has been chosen.
For some connected interval I ⊆ R, a smooth curve γ : I →M is timelike if
the tangent vector ξa at each point in γ[I] is timelike. Similarly, a curve is null
(respectively, spacelike) if its tangent vector at each point is null (respectively,
spacelike). A curve is causal if its tangent vector at each point is either null or
timelike. A causal curve is future-directed if its tangent vector at each point falls
in or on the future lobe of the light cone. For any smooth curve γ : I →M with




2 ds. When γ is timelike, its
length represents the elapsed proper time along the curve.
We say a curve γ : I →M is not maximal if there is another curve γ′ : I ′ →
M such that I is a proper subset of I ′ and γ(s) = γ′(s) for all s ∈ I. A curve
γ : I → M in a spacetime (M, gab) a geodesic if ξa∇aξb = 0 where ξa is the
tangent vector and ∇a is the unique derivative operator compatible with gab. A
spacetime (M, gab) is geodesically complete if every maximal geodesic γ : I →M
is such that I = R. If an incomplete geodesic is timelike or null, there is a useful
distinction one can introduce. We say that a future-directed timelike or null
geodesic γ : I → M without future endpoint is future incomplete if there is an
r ∈ R such that s < r for all s ∈ I. A past incomplete timelike or null geodesic
is defined analogously.
A point p ∈ M is a future endpoint of a future-directed causal curve γ :
I → M if, for every neighborhood O of p, there exists a point t0 ∈ I such
that γ(t) ∈ O for all t > t0. A past endpoint is defined similarly. A causal
curve is future inextendible (respectively, past inextendible) if it has no future
(respectively, past) endpoint. A spacetime (M, gab) is effectively complete if, for
every future or past incomplete timelike geodesic γ : I →M , and every open set
O containing γ, there is no isometric embedding ϕ : O → M ′ into some other
spacetime (M ′, g′ab) such that ϕ ◦ γ has future and past endpoints.
For any two points p, q ∈M , we write p << q if there exists a future-directed
timelike curve from p to q. We write p < q if there exists a future-directed causal
curve from p to q. These relations allow us to define the timelike and causal
pasts and futures of a point p: I−(p) = {q : q << p}, I+(p) = {q : p << q},
J−(p) = {q : q < p}, and J+(p) = {q : p < q}. We say a spacetime is J-
closed if, for all p ∈ M , the sets J−(p) and J+(p) are topologically closed. A
spacetime satisfies chronology if there is no p ∈ M such that p ∈ I+(p). A
spacetime which violates chronology has timelike curves γ : [s0, s1] → M such
that γ(s0) = γ(s1); such timelike curves are called closed. We say a spacetime
satisfies strong causality if, for all points p ∈M and every open set O containing
p, there is an open set V ⊂ O also containing p such that no causal curve
intersects V more than once. A spacetime satisfies stable causality if there is
a smooth function t : M → R such that for any distinct points p, q ∈ M , if
q ∈ J+(p), then t(p) < t(q).
A set S ⊂ M is achronal if no two points in S can be connected by a
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timelike curve. The edge of a closed, achronal set S ⊂ M is the set of points
p ∈ S such that every open neighborhood O of p contains a point q ∈ I+(p), a
point r ∈ I−(p), and a timelike curve from r to q which does not intersect S.
A set S ⊂ M is a slice if it is closed, achronal, and without edge. A spacetime
(M, gab) which contains a slice S such that D(S) = M is said to be globally
hyperbolic. In such a spacetime, we say S is a Cauchy surface.
Two spacetimes (M, gab) and (M
′, g′ab) are isometric if there is a diffeomor-
phism ψ : M → M ′ such that ψ∗(gab) = g′ab. We say a spacetime (M ′, g′ab) is
an extension of (M, gab) if there is a proper subset N of M
′ such that (M, gab)
and (N, g′ab) are isometric. We say a spacetime is maximal if it has no exten-
sion. A spacetime (M, gab) is past-maximal if, for each of its maximal extensions
(M ′, g′ab) with isometric embedding ψ : M →M ′, we have I−(ψ(M)) = ψ(M).
A future-maximal spacetime is defined analogously.
3 Malament-Hogarth Spacetimes
It has been argued that some models of general relativity have a spacetime
structure suitable for the implementation of “supertasks” of a certain kind.2
The idea is beautifully simple. Consider the following definition.
Definition. A spacetime (M, gab) is Malament-Hogarth if there is a past-
extendible timelike curve γ : I →M and a point p ∈M such that (i) ‖γ‖ =∞
and (ii) γ[I] ⊂ I−(p).
Consider a Malament-Hogarth spacetime (M, gab) and let p ∈ M and γ :
I → M be as in the definition. Let q be the past endpoint of γ. The points q
and p represent, respectively, the beginning and the end of the supertask. At
q, consider two observers (call them A and B) who decide to take very different
future paths through spacetime. Observer A follows the path along γ. Observer
B takes any path from q to p. (It follows from condition (ii) that a timelike
curve exists with past endpoint q and future endpoint p.) Condition (ii) ensures
that a signal can be sent from any point along γ to the point p. Condition (i)
ensures that observer A has an infinite amount of future time along γ. Thus,
there is a sense in which observer B can, from the point p, “view an eternity in
a finite time” (Hogarth 1992).
Anti-de Sitter spacetime is the paradigm Malament-Hogarth example (see
Earman and Norton 1993). In two dimensions, the spacetime is (M, gab) where
M = R2 and gab = cosh2 x∇at∇bt − ∇ax∇bx. By inspection we see that the
light cones widen rapidly as |x| → ∞. It turns out that because of this fact,
there exist past-extendible timelike curves γ : I → M− such that ‖γ‖ = ∞
where M− = {(t, x) ∈ M : t < 0}. Moreover, there are points p such that
2See, for example, the following: Pitowski 1990; Hogarth 1992, 1994; Earman and Norton
1993, 1996; Etesi, G., and I. Ne´meti 2002; Manchak 2010; Manchak and Roberts 2016; Andre´ka
et al. 2017.
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M− ⊂ I−(p). It follows that anti-de Sitter spacetime is Malament-Hogarth.
(See figure 1.)
p
Figure 1: Anti-de Sitter spacetime is Malament-Hogarth since the past-
extendible timelike curve γ is contained in I−(p) and is such that ‖γ‖ =∞.
Anti-de Sitter spacetime fails to be globally hyperbolic and this turns out to
be a general feature shared by all Malament-Hogarth spacetimes. We have the
following (Hogarth 1992).
Proposition. All Malament-Hogarth spacetimes fail to be globally hyperbolic.
The cosmic censorship hypothesis championed by Penrose (1979, 1999) can
be stated as: “All physically reasonable spacetimes are globally hyperbolic”
(Wald 1984, 304). Suppose for a moment that this statement is true. Then, a
corollary to the above proposition is the statement that no Malament-Hogarth
spacetime is physically reasonable. Now since Penrose’s version of the cosmic
censorship is quite controversial (see Earman 1995), there is still room to argue
that there that non globally hyperbolic spacetimes can be physically reasonable
in some sense. But there are other potential problems for Malament-Hogarth
spacetimes (see Earman and Norton 1993). In the anti-de Sitter example, the
curve γ has an infinite total (integrated) acceleration. This means that observer
A would need an infinite amount of fuel to take such a path through spacetime.
Another complication is the “divergent blueshift” problem. The worry is this:
the frequency of signals sent from observer A to observer B is amplified more
and more as time goes on. Eventually, “even the slightest thermal noise will be
amplified to such an extent that communication is all but impossible” (Manchak
and Roberts 2016). Both the infinite acceleration and divergent blueshift prob-
lems can be easily avoided if chronology is violated. But we wish to emphasize
here that even if one restricts attention to stably causal (and hence chronolog-
ical) spacetimes, one can still find Malament-Hogarth spacetimes which avoid
all of the problems mentioned above and more (see Manchak 2010; Andre´ka
et al. 2017). In other words, it remains an open question whether there exist
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physically reasonable Malament-Hogarth spacetimes.
4 Machines
Malament-Hogarth spacetimes are certainly fascinating. But we are ultimately
interested in the possibility of “bringing about” their properties in our own uni-
verse. We know that whatever else is the case, one cannot make sense of this
“bringing about” by employing the usual notion of causal determinism present
in general relativity; as mentioned above, a globally hyperbolic spacetime can
never be Malament-Hogarth. The literature on “machines” – especially “time
machines” and “hole machines” (Earman, Wu¨thrich, and Manchak 2016) – pro-
vides a framework to understand the “bringing about” notion in a quite general
way.3 Consider the following.
Definition. A past-maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime is a (P, Q)-
machine if (i) some extension to the spacetime has P and (ii) every extension
which has P also has Q.
A past-maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime represents a “time” before
the machine is switched on; let us call such a spacetime a starter in what follows.
PropertyP is used to pare down the space of starter extensions to those which
are “physically reasonable” in some sense.4 Property Q is the one intended
to be brought about by the machine. Condition (ii) captures the idea that all
“physically reasonable” starter extensions have Q. Condition (i) is added to
avoid a nuisance case; we don’t want to count a starter as a (P, Q)-machine
simply because (ii) is vacuously true.
Research on (P,Q)-machines has (so far) focused primarily on existence
results where Q is the failure of chronology. Consider the following “time ma-
chine” existence result, for example (Manchak 2011a).
Proposition. There exist (P, Q)-machines where P is J-closedness and Q is
the failure of chronology.
The starter used to exhibit the above proposition is the “bottom half” of
Misner spacetime (see Hawking and Ellis 1973). Consider Misner spacetime
(M, gab): M = R× S and gab = 2∇(at∇b)ϕ+ t∇aϕ∇bϕ where the points (t, ϕ)
are identified with the points (t, ϕ+ 2pin) for all integers n. The bottom half of
Misner spacetime is (M−, gab) where M− = {(t, ϕ) ∈ M : t < 0}. (See figure
2.) One can verify that (M−, gab) is a starter; it is past-maximal and globally
hyperbolic. Now, some extensions to the starter have P and some do not. But
it turns out that all extensions to the starter which have P also have Q.
3See also: Earman 1995; Earman, Smeenk, and Wu¨thrich 2009; Krasnikov 2002, 2014;
Manchak 2009a, 2009b 2011a, 2014a; Smeenk and Wu¨thrich 2010.
4See Manchak 2011b for a discussion of our limitations in determining the class of “physi-
cally reasonable” spacetimes.
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Figure 2: The “bottom half” of Misner spacetime is a (P, Q)-machine where
P is J-closedness and Q is the failure of chronology.
We close this section with a word concerning the structure of existence results
like those considered above. Suppose for some properties P and Q one finds
there is a (P, Q)-machine. It is important to note that one’s choice of P is,
in general, crucial for the existence result to go through: If P0 ⇒P ⇒P1 for
some properties P0, P1, there is no guarantee that either a (P0, Q)-machine
or a (P1, Q)-machine exists. The former is not guaranteed sinceP0 may be so
strong that the starter used to exhibit the (P,Q)-machine may not even have
a P0 extension. The latter is not guaranteed either; if the class of “physically
reasonable” spacetimes is enlarged by P1, it is possible that the starter used
to exhibit the (P, Q)-machine may be such that one of its P1-but-not-P
extensions is not Q.
5 Malament-Hogarth Machines
Using the framework from the preceding section, one defines a “Malament-
Hogarth machine” to be a (P, Q)-machine where Q is the property of being
a Malament-Hogarth spacetime. What about P? As noted above, one’s choice
of P is generally quite important; an existence result may fail if P is either
too strong or too weak.
One often restricts attention to “physically reasonable” spacetimes by invok-
ing a pair of global conditions – one to rule out artificial “holes” in spacetime
and one to rule out “bad” causal structure (see Earman 1995). There are two
useful logical hierarchies to consider. We have a “no-holes” hierarchy (Manchak
2014b): geodesic completeness (GC) ⇒ effective completeness (EC) ⇒ maxi-
mality (M). And we have a (simplified) hierarchy of causal conditions (Wald
1984): global hyperbolicity (GC) ⇒ stable causality (SC) ⇒ strong causality
(Str) ⇒ chronology (C). Using these hierarchies, one can settle a quite a few
open questions concerning Malament-Hogarth machines in one fell-swoop. We
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have the following.
Proposition. There exist (P, Q)-machines where Q is the property of being
Malament-Hogarth and P is any property such that ((SC) & (GC)) ⇒P.
Proof. Here we construct an example which is conformally equivalent to a
portion of Minkowski spacetime. The example is two-dimensional for the sake
of simplicity but can be easily generalized to any dimension n ≥ 2.
Consider Minkowski spacetime (R2, ηab) in standard (t, x) coordinates: ηab =
∇at∇bt−∇ax∇bx. Let us agree that our temporal orientation is such that the
vector (∂/∂t)a is future-directed. Let M = R2 − J+((0, 0)) and let gab = Ω2ηab
where the function Ω : M → R is defined by Ω(t, x) = (t2 + x2)−1. The
spacetime (M, gab) is conformally equivalent to (and therefore has the same
causal structure as) the portion (M,ηab) of Minkowski spacetime. Since (M,ηab)
is globally hyperbolic, so is (M, gab). (The set {(t, x) ∈ M : t = −1} is one
Cauchy surface.) By construction, (M, gab) is past-maximal. We now show that
any extension to (M, gab) is a Malament-Hogarth spacetime.
Let (M ′, g′ab) be any extension at all of (M, gab). Consider the curve γ :
(0, 1) → M defined by γ(s) = (s − 1, 0). So the tangent vector ξa is (∂/∂t)a
at every point along γ. Thus, γ is a future-directed timelike curve with past


















(t2 + x2)−1dt. But
since x = 0 along γ, the last quantity simplifies to
∫
γ
t−2dt = −t−1∣∣0−1 =∞.
q
p
Figure 3: The region M ∪ O of M ′. A future-directed timelike curve λ can be
constructed from every point q ∈ γ[I] to the point p.
Let p ∈ M ′ be any point on the boundary of M . One can extended the
coordinate system on M to M ∪ O for some neighborhood O of p. Clearly,
p = (pt, px) is such that pt > 0 and |px| = pt. Without loss of generality, let
us assume that pt = px. (An analogous argument can be given for pt = −px.)
Let q = (qt, 0) be any point on γ[I]. Let λ : [0, 1] → M ′ be defined by λ(s) =
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((pt−qt)s+qt, spx). We find that the tangent vector ζa at every point along λ is
(pt−qt)(∂/∂t)a+px(∂/∂x)a. So ζaζa = Ω2[(pt−qt)2−p2x]. Because pt = px > 0
and qt < 0, we see that ζ
a is a future-directed timelike vector. Since λ(0) = q
and λ(1) = p, it follows that p ∈ I+(q). (See Figure 3.) Since q is an arbitrary
point on γ[I], we have γ[I] ⊂ I−(p). Thus, (M ′, g′ab) is a Malament-Hogarth
spacetime.
We are done if we can find an extension to (M, gab) which is stably causal
and geodesically complete. But this is easy: consider the extension (M ′, g′ab)
such that M ′ = R2 −{(0, 0)} and g′ab = Ω′2ηab where the function Ω′ : M ′ → R
is defined by Ω′(t, x) = (t2 + x2)−1. 
6 Conclusion
We close with a suggestion for future work. In the preceding, no imposition
has been made on the local structure of spacetime; in particular, Einstein’s
equation (with some reasonable matter source) did not enter into the discus-
sion. Essentially, we have leaned heavily on the idea that “one’s lack of concern
with Einstein’s equation in these examples is a reflection of the experience that
things which can happen in the absence of this equation can usually also happen
in its presence” (Geroch and Horowitz 1979, 215). That said, it might be of
interest to see if an existence result can still be obtained if one restricts atten-
tion to Malament-Hogarth spacetimes whose stress energy tensor Tab (given by
Einstein’s equation) satisfies some energy condition or other (see Earman and
Norton 1993).
Let (E) be any one of several energy condition of interest (see Curiel 2017).
Given the hierarchies mentioned in the previous section, sixteen open questions
present themselves which (without further argument) are independent of each
other. (There is plenty of work to do here!)
Question. Do there exist (P, Q)-machines if Q is the property of being
Malament-Hogarth and P is any one of the following?
1. (E)
2. (E) & (M)
3. (E) & (EC)
4. (E) & (GC)
5. (E) & (C)
6. (E) & (C) & (M)
7. (E) & (C) & (EC)
8. (E) & (C) & (GC)
9. (E) & (Str)
10. (E) & (Str) & (M)
11. (E) & (Str) & (EC)
12. (E) & (Str) & (GC)
13. (E) & (SC)
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14. (E) & (SC) & (M)
15. (E) & (SC) & (EC)
16. (E) & (SC) & (GC)
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